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Anti-Radiation Missiles vs. Radars
Stanisław Czeszejko
Abstract—In this article the author makes an attempt to char-
acterize the factors which are to be taken into consideration while
designing the ground radar component of Air Defense systems,
in order to enable them to operate on the modern battlefield. He
presents the latest theoretical views on the relationship between
the usage of anti-radar weapons and the organizational and
technical defense mechanisms which can be deployed against such
weapons. In particular the author emphasizes the protection of
radars against anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) which present the
biggest threat for effective Air Defense systems. He also stresses
the need to combine radars into one system which enables the
streamlining of their work parameters and thus ensuring their
complex usage. The gaining of those capabilities will guarantee
that the parameters of the air surveillance radar zone can be
defined effectively.
Keywords—anti-radiation missiles, radar, radiolocation, air
defense system, survive to operate on the battlefield
I. ANTI-RADIATION MISSILES
S INCE the middle of the 20th century radars have been de-stroyed by specialized weapons – anti-radiation missiles,
homing in on the electromagnetic radiation of the radars. Over
the decades the radars have been modified and modernized.
New ones have been constructed and different exploitation
techniques have been developed. The technical progress of
these devices is a never-ending competition.
The anti-radiation missiles destroy radars which are ele-
ments of the opponent’s air defence system, this in turn allows
for the free operating of friendly aircraft within the enemy’s
airspace and then also, during combat within the opponent’s
territory, their targets are also various objects located there. In
the first case, aircrafts carrying these missiles attempt to fulfil
the task without entering the striking distance of the ground
elements of the enemy’s air defence system (rockets and barrel
artillery). Such operations demand proper evaluation of the
space striking abilities of the system and to ensure the system
is equipped with weapons of the proper strike range needed for
destroying the defence system elements. In the second case,
the air defence system elements are attacked while crossing
the border of their strike range. Also, the weapons systems
protecting important objects within the opponent’s territory
are eliminated.
While estimating the influence of the anti-radiation missiles’
strike range one cannot neglect the inseparable parameter
of the missile flight speed. These two parameters determine
the time in which the missile reaches the target after being
launched from the plane. Table 1 presents the simplified data
concerning the speed, range and flight time of the chosen anti-
radiation missiles, which shall be discussed in more detail
further on. Anti-radiation missiles can be divided roughly
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according to their range into short range missiles (maximum
100 km), mid-range missiles (maximum 200 km) and long
range missiles (over 200 km).
Another important parameter of the anti-radiation missiles is
the efficiency of target damage done by the warhead exploding,
this is significant for the radar’s survival on the battlefield. In
the 1950s the low target accuracy of the anti-radiation missiles
was compensated by using warheads of high explosive power,
large enough for strategic aircrafts to carry them. During
the 1960s three new weight categories of warheads appeared
(approximately 150 kg, 86-90 kg and 66 kg); these are still in
use with just a few exceptions. In comparison with the former
generation of missiles, their higher accuracy and probability
of hitting the target allowed for achieving expected striking
efficiency in each of these categories. In addition, the distance
(altitude) of the fuse from the target was optimized. Such was
the situation until the beginning of the 1990s, when the British
ALARM missile appeared, whose efficiency is proved by the
possibility of attacking a radar with a within 1 meter accuracy
(without GPS). For example, the AGM-45 Shrike missile (with
approximately a 66 kg warhead) was striking the radars within
15 meters range, and its A version was equipped with high-
explosives containing 20000 cubic piercing fragments (while
hitting the target directly or imprecisely with this missile
a high striking effect could be achieved), while the Ch-58USzE
missile (with an approximate 150 kg warhead) could hit radars
within a range of 20 meters. The target accuracy of the Ch-
15P and Ch-58USzE missiles is 5-8 meters, of the Ch-31P
missile up to 5-7 m, and of the AGM-88 A/B HARM missile
the target accuracy is estimated as between 7.3-9 m. Also, for
the Ch-58USzE missile the target hitting probability within the
range of 20 meters is 0.8. The AGM-88C HARM warhead is
equipped with 12845 tungsten cubes (5 mm), able to perforate
a 12.7 mm thick soft metal sheet or a 6.35 mm thick armoured
plate from a distance of 6 meters, maintaining the missile’s
target accuracy. The German ARMIGER missile has quite
a small warhead, only 20 kg, and its target accuracy is less
than 1 meter (≤ 1 m). Probably the target accuracy of the
American AGM-88E AARGM missile is on a similar level to
that of the ARMIGER missile (≤ 1 m); since both of them
are based on the same construction (AGM-88D HARM) and
both represent the same technological advancement level.
But in order to deploy the missile within the efficient strike
range it must be equipped with a proper guidance system.
Missiles produced in the 1950s and 1960s were homed to the
electromagnetic radiation of the radars with support of the
inertial guidance system only. The whole process was con-
trolled by a technologically simple autopilot. In the 1970s the
dynamic development of miniature transistor-circuit systems
began, and they were also employed by the constructors of
the anti-radiation missiles homing systems. The following two
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decades were characterised by the improvement of the existing
electronics of the missiles, the aim being the possibility of
constructing devices equipped with programmable data bases.
They allowed for the comparison of the parameters of detected
radars and thus the ability to choose those most dangerous
or those which have been pre-defined – as a the specifics of
a given combat task demanded. In addition, the contractors
increased the possibilities of eliminating jammers, i.e. the
sources of purposeful electromagnetic disturbance and thus
improved the missiles’ exploitation flexibility.
A conventional anti-radiation missile is homed primarily to
the radar’s mainlobe emission, but also to the emission of its
horizontal sidelobes and the backlobes emission – it depends
on the distance between the radar and the missile. However,
in the case of the older radars the primary target is their
horizontal sidelobes and backlobes emission of a very high
level, which radiate continually. This allows the missile to
have uninterrupted tracking of the radar and the passive anti-
radiation homing receiver does not become saturated. Modern
radars with a very low level of the horizontal sidelobes and
backlobes emissions are a “blinking” target for a missile, and
the “blinking” is the result of the intervals in receiving the
radar mainlobe emission during the turn of its antenna. In
such a situation, the on-board systems of missiles without GPS
are forced to estimate the radar’s position on the basis of an
intermittently received emission. When the turn speed of the
antenna is low (long intervals in receiving the emission), the
guidance system of the missile is supported by its inertial
system, especially during the final phase of flight, which
often results with a bigger margin of error (a few meters)
in detecting the position of the radar than was assumed
beforehand. The error is usually increased to such an extent
that in the moment of directly hitting the target the warhead
is not set off by a contact fuse but by a proximity fuse. In
order to maintain the attack efficiency, the warhead must be
equipped with a much stronger explosive.
In 1973, during the Israeli-Arabian Yom Kippur War,
conventional anti-radiation missiles of the 1950s’ genera-
tion were used. At that time, Egyptian Tu-16 bombers fired
13 KSR-2 and 12 KSR-11 (KSR-2P) missiles from above
the Mediterranean towards the targets located on the coast
and inside Israeli territory. Most of the missiles (about 20)
were intercepted and destroyed by either the air force or the
HAWK surface-to-air missiles. 5 of them penetrated through
the Israeli air defence system and reached their designated
targets. Three radars and one logistic point on the Sinai
Peninsula were eliminated. Missiles of the 1970s’ generation
were used during the Iraqi-Iranian war (1980–1988) by the
Iraqi aircrafts which were targeting Ch-28 missiles towards the
radars of the Iranian HAWK systems. Effects of these attacks
have not been revealed, unlike the results of the Ch-22MP
BURJA missiles which were launched from the Iraqi Tu-22K
bombers. Despite numerous launchings towards the HAWK
radars, only one missile hit its target. The reason was the
poor training of the Iraqi bomber crews, the low efficiency
of the guiding system (on the missiles and the deck systems
of the bombers), as well as difficulties in efficiently detecting
the radars’ position from a long distance. Therefore, later the
launchings took place at a distance of 60 km or less and
the missiles were carried by the Tu-16 bombers. The targets
attacked were mainly located near Teheran: oil refineries and
other cities protected by the anti-aircraft system of Iran. The
missiles of the 1980s’ generation were used for the first time
on 15th April 1986 during the US bombing of Libya (Tripoli
and Benghazi), code-named “Operation El Dorado Canyon”.
AGM-88A Harm anti-radiation missiles were homed very
efficiently eliminating the radars of Libyan air defence system
rocket launchers (SA-2 GUIDELINE or S-75 DZWINA, SA-3
GOA or S-125 PECZORA and SA-5 GAMMON or S-200
ANGARA) located around the Gulf of Sidra [1].
In the 1990s the British ALARM missile appeared, in-
troducing some changes in the context of fighting radars.
ALARM can be used in the same way as the conventional
missiles constructed so far, but in addition it is able to detect
and destroy radars independently. It climbs to an altitude
of 12000-21000 meters within the task zone [2]. There its
engine is turned off, the parachute opens and the missile starts
diving slowly, while its passive anti-radiation homing receiver
searches for the target – an operating radar. When such is
detected, the parachute detaches itself and due to gravity the
missile – directed by the guidance system – moves towards the
radar. The ALARM missile was created before GPS started to
be used in such constructions and its operating method has
its reasons. The so called vertical attack of this missile is
a result of an assumption that had been made before even the
ALARM project appeared. The passive anti-radiation homing
receiver of this missile independently homes itself towards
the radar emission radiating vertically up, i.e. towards the
vertical sidelobes. Since most of the radars became able to
locate the air objects with high accuracy, the emission level
of the horizontal sidelobes and backlobes have lowered, in
comparison to high emission level of the vertical sidelobes.
Regardless of the direction of the mainlobe emission of the
radar, the ALARM passive anti-radiation homing receiver is
able to track continuously the fluctuating microwave emission
leaking upward from the radar’s antenna.
Guiding to the vertical sidelobes (vertical attack at an
angle of 90 ◦) has an additional aspect, namely reducing the
influence of emission coming from radiation reflected by the
ground objects, which in case of attack at an angle of 20 ◦-
40 ◦ normally widens the margin of error. Taking advantage
of it, the ALARM missile is able to attack the target with
high accuracy. Moreover, the accuracy is 1 meter, i.e. the
explosion should be initiated in the distance of 1 meter from
the radar antenna, which increases its most explosive power.
The programmable warhead of this missile can have a data
base containing information on the general construction of
every type of radar, which show, among other details, the
place where the antenna is located. This enables the missile to
initiate a precise explosion destroying the antenna system or
the main electronic systems located in the main blocks of the
radar’s board (it depends on what task has been programmed
before). It is of special importance in case of eliminating radars
whose antennas are raised high, designed for detecting also air
objects flying at low altitude. It must be emphasized that the
warhead of an anti-radiation missile equipped with smaller
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explosive exploding very close to the antenna will result in
the same destruction level as a warhead with bigger explosive
exploding at a greater distance.
Such missiles were used for the first time during the First
Gulf War (1990–1991). 121 ALARM missiles were launched
from British TORNADO aircraft, which carried out 24 mission
aimed only at destroying the air defence system of Iraq and
52 SEAD missions (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences),
operating within the opponent’s airspace. In a few cases the
launching of the ALARMs of the first experimental series were
unsuccessful [2]. In order to eliminate the Iraqi air defence
system elements, the coalition forces used also HARM anti-
radiation missiles. During the “Desert Storm” operation about
2000 of these were launched at the Iraqi radars [3]. A question
might be asked as to whether Iraq really had so many air
defence radars. However, one can conclude that these missiles
were used on many occasions only preventively. Some sources
prove that the initiators of such launchings were mainly the
pilots of the US Navy (F/A-18 planes), who were using
an imprecise warning system – the first version of ALR-67
RWR [4], while the crews of aircrafts designed especially for
the SEAD missions, carried out well planned selection, had
more time for destroying their targets (it is their main task);
they were also better trained and equipped, with much better
electronics.
During the First Gulf War ALARM missiles, climbing
vertically, were a novelty for many allied pilots. Quite often
the missiles speeding upwards (aiming at reaching maximum
speed and starting the parachute dive) were mistaken for Iraqi
air defence system rockets, which would alarm the battle
group unnecessarily, with accounts of such events becoming
transformed into various anecdotes.
The analysis of the conflict of the 1990s and experiences
resulting from it led to the upgrading of some of the missiles
by equipping their guidance systems with additional elements.
One of the most important experiences came from the pe-
riod of NATO operating over the Balkan peninsula. During
the NATO air operation called “Deliberate Force” of 1995,
American AGM-88 HARM missiles of the first versions were
used. In addition the American F-16 aircraft were already then
equipped with the Harm Targeting System (HTS), which was
used then for the first time in a combat environment. During
the 1999 period of this conflict ALARM, AGM-88B HARM
and AGM-88C HARM missiles were launched over Serbia and
Kosovo, but they were not able to do serious damage to the ex-
tremely mobile Yugoslavian air-defence forces. The damages
were symbolic and resulted from the too low accuracy of the
inertial guiding systems homing the missiles. This provided
a strong impulse for the development and later use of GPS in
the guidance systems.
In the 1990s, during the Balkan conflict, NATO planes
launched altogether 743 HARM missiles, 6 ALARMs and
8 ARMATs towards the radars of the Yugoslavian air defence
forces. However, only about 115-130 of the ground tar-
gets emitting electromagnetic radiation were attacked, which
proves the high efficiency of the Yugoslavian forces’ oper-
ations, i.e. the high discipline level concerning the limited
time of radars’ radiation (up to 10 seconds) and the high
mobility of the forces (constantly changing the positions of
the anti-aircraft weapons). The NATO official reports state
that the efficiency of the HARM missiles was 3%-6.6%,
depending on the operation’s phase [5]. The high efficiency
of the Yugoslavian forces was proved by the fact that during
the operations the Americans decided to deploy to Italy their
experimental Tiger Team from China Lake Weapons Division
(USA), an institution testing new weapons. During just 36
days, its pilots tested over 400 HARM missiles, in order to
develop new tactics for launching them, allowing for increased
efficiency. The effects of their work were instantly transferred
to the US Navy units. As a result, immediately more of the
attacked objects were destroyed [6].
By the year 2000 the US Air Force and US Marine Corps
(USMC) had taken procession of over 19600 AGM-88 Harm
missiles of different versions, while by 1997 the German
Bundeswehra bought for the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) and
Marineflieger (German Naval Air Force) exactly 1000 Harm
missiles.
The best known military conflict of the first decade of the
21st century, during which anti-radiation missiles were used,
was the Second Gulf War of 2003. The elements of the Iraqi air
defence system were being then destroyed by, among others,
the HARM missiles – over 400 of them were launched towards
all kinds of Iraqi radars [7]. Taking into account the economic
situation of Iraq and its low possibilities of recreating its air de-
fence system after the war of 1990-91 and various subsequent
air operations (e.g.“Desert Fox”), the number of launched anti-
radiation missiles might seem too large, especially that they
were better developed technologically and also the AGM-88C
HARM missiles were already accessible. At that time, the
American planes were already equipped with an instrument
for launching the anti-radiation missiles for self-protection,
and probably this function was used excessively by the crews
of the combat planes carrying such missiles.
The most recent military conflict, during which the anti-
radiation missiles were used, was the war in the Southern
Ossetia of 2008 (Georgia’s forces vs. combined forces of
Southern Ossetia, Abkhazia and Russia). At that time, the
basic equipment of the Georgian radar forces was a few ST-
68U (36D6-M) radars of Soviet production; they were quite
difficult to be manoeuvred. In a relatively short time, the
Russian air forces managed to eliminate all Georgian radars.
All the above-mentioned experiences triggered further de-
velopment. The first decade of the 21st century was a period
of intensified development of the guidance systems homing
the anti-radiation missiles towards the radars. These systems
became equipped with GPS: American AGM-88D HARM and
AGM-88E AARGM missiles, German ARMIGER missiles
and Israeli STAR-1 missile. In addition, ARMIGER was
also equipped with an Infrared sensor, providing a picture
processed by a special system. Probably, this was caused by
the fact that earlier the German TORNADO.ECR, specialized
aircraft equipped with such sensors, were able to lower the
electromagnetic emission of the plain’s board. But it was
the configuration of the AGM-88E AARGM missile that was
subject to greatest modification. This missile does not have an
Infrared sensor, but it is equipped with active millimetre wave
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radar with an extremely precise Doppler modulator (active
radar seeker), which increased the possibilities of fighting
both stationary and mobile targets (e.g. a radar changing
position after being turned off). Also, this missile contains
a system for information exchange via radio [8] (used for
updating the data on the radar for the missile – as a part of
targeting – and in order to transfer information about the radar
being fought, recorded just before the moment of explosion
of the missile hitting the target). The systems built in the
AGM-88E AARGM missile allow its own millimetre wave
radar to fully cooperating with the digital passive receiver
of electromagnetic waves [9]. This makes the radar operator
unable to stop the missile’s attack on the radar by turning
it off, changing its combat position or turning on a decoy
– a radar electromagnetic trap imitating the radar’s signal
meant to attract the missile away from the real radar, i.e.
creating a false location of the attacked radar. The head of
the millimetre wave radar is meant to track the location of the
attacked radar in a way which allows the missile to hit the
real radar and not the false source of emission (decoy), even
if the radar would start to move. Also, it is worth mentioning
a slightly different type of anti-radiation missile, namely the
American AGM-136 TACIT RAINBOW and Israeli STAR-1
missiles. They are in fact cruise missiles, in which the warhead
is built into the vehicle and which after being launched travel
in front of the air strike force following a pre-programmed
flight path. Their task is to destroy the anti-aircraft radars
located in the planes flight path.
The second decade of the 21st century brought only scant
promises for the construction of new missiles, regardless of
the fact that the scientists of many states must be working on
new technical solutions. In 2012 it was announced that new
Russian anti-radiation missiles shall have the same possibilities
which already characterize their existing Western counterparts.
The code of the Ch-31PD missiles (probably produced in
2003) reveals only their serious modernization (mainly of the
warhead), which shall be surely based on the exploitation of
the satellite guiding homing systems. Obviously, it may be
expected that because of the expected export, the Russians will
not use the Russian Glonass satellite system exclusively and
they also will produce a missile version using the Western GPS
system. Of course, applying a completely new technical guid-
ing solution cannot be excluded (e.g. the German ARMIGER
– additional use of Infrared sensor). In the case of a solution
similar to the AGM-88E AARGM (additional active millimeter
wave radar), the basis of such a construction can be a warhead
of an already existing missile (e.g. Ch-15S, Ch-25MAE or
Ch-58A). Time shall show the direction of Russian military
technological development [10].
Evaluating the development of the existing anti-radiation
missiles, one could single out a few main ways of fighting
radars:
• direct attack – a missile launched usually at a middle
or long distance climbs to a great altitude (e.g. for Ch-
32P it is 22000 meters), then accelerates, achieving its
maximum speed in the final phase of the flight, denying
thus the radar crew the ability to react to the attack. The
target may be hit at a classical angle (like most missiles,
between 20 ◦ and 40 ◦) or vertically (90 ◦ – ALARM
missile);
• shallow dive trajectory attack – the missile is usually
launched from a short distance, it attacks the radar
in a shallow dive trajectory, and it does not achieve
maximum height, moving with optimal cruise speed;
• delayed attack – the missile may be launched at any
height, it reaches its maximum height, then turns off the
engine and starts diving with a parachute, which detaches
after detecting the radar; then the missile due to gravity
falls down, homing towards the target (vertical attack at
an angle of 90 ◦, performed nowadays only by the British
ALARM missile – so called “loiter mode”);
• manoeuvring attack – a cruise anti-radiation missile built
as a plane (it can be manoeuvring in a defined area and
waiting for a radar to be turned on), and its main task
is destroying the anti-aircraft radars located in the planes
flight path (e.g. American AGM-136 TACIT RAINBOW
or Israeli STAR-1 missiles).
The construction of modern planes and the modernizing of
them is nowadays aimed at adjusting them to simultaneous
ability to carry arms from the weapons factories of the West
and the East. The last operations are also forced by the
companies fighting for the right to sell weapons abroad. Also,
many countries have in their arsenals anti-radiation missiles
from different technological eras, which results in the fact that
in the field of combat any type of missile may appear.
II. DETECTION AND STRIKING SYSTEMS
It is already possible to recognize the target and transfer
this data in real time via the existing communication sys-
tems. However, there remains the question of putting this
information into use for destroying the radars. However, there
are already some good solutions in this context, e.g. the
so called “multi-ships techniques”, which mean the process
in which each aircraft of the air strike force is optimally
exploited [11]. A good example of this is the subsystem of
F-16CJ, named HTS R7 (Harm Targeting System – HTS
development version R7), which is an element of the guidance
system fighting the sources of electromagnetic emission of
the opponent (Joint Emitter Targeting System – JETS). It
enables pilots to carry out the SEAD missions in areas strongly
saturated with anti-aircraft systems, due to it being equipped
with satellite navigation receivers: GPS and with elements
of the data transmission system Link-16, which, combined,
allow for the efficient destroying of radars not only by the
anti-radiation AGM-88 HARM missiles, but also by Precision
Guided Munition – PGMs.
Also, for the planes of the next generation (e.g. F/A-18)
a newer Target Acquisition System (TAS) was developed.
Moreover, during a radar fighting operation numerous types
of bombs can be used (diving gravitationally) and missiles
(e.g. with rocket propulsion or ramjets), guided by different
systems allowing for precise homing towards the target using
electromagnetic radiation (guiding by radio or active radar),
infrared radiation, laser radiation, guiding by optical systems
(television or electro-optical systems), satellite guiding sys-
tems or by electric signals transmitted by a cable joining the
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missile and platform (the plane or the unmanned aerial vehicle
– UAV).
III. THE MAIN QUESTION
Which design assumptions shall enable us to avoid the
effects of an anti-radiation missile attack aimed at the radar
or minimize the effects of such attack?
IV. DETECTION
Each radar should be equipped with an internally integrated
automatic alarm system, which – in the case of detecting an
attacking anti-radiation missile – will in the first instance turn
off the radar (electromagnetic radiation), and subsequently the
alarm system will activate a distracting device (a decoy). Next,
the system will turn on a siren alarming the personnel located
near the radar, and it will also send information about the
type of attack to the higher command level. The alarm system
should also activate other functions, which shall be described
in greater detail below. Currently, in case of an attack, it is
only possible to switch of the radar, activate the decoy and
evacuate the radar personnel (if they are not using the remote
control steering system of the radar).
V. TIME OF OPERATING ON RADAR PICKET
The operating time of a radar (electromagnetic radiation)
should be limited to a minimum. In battle conditions a radar’s
antenna must rotate in a full circle (360 ◦) a minimum of once.
In case of mid and long-range radars produced in Poland, the
time of scanning the full circle differs from 2.5s to 10s [12],
which can be shortened only by means of sector operation
(electromagnetic radiation).
The total time of folding the radar consists of fractional
phases: folding of the antenna, lifting the stabilizing supports,
disconnecting and throwing away the cables and light pipes.
At the moment, 5 minutes is the shortest time necessary for
the folding of a radar produced in Poland (NUR-21, NUR-22).
In order to radically shorten the process of radar folding, it is
necessary to construct each mobile radar as a single vehicle,
as well as equip it with automated mechanisms for the antenna
“drop” (moving down), lifting the stabilizing supports, discon-
necting and throwing away the cables and light pipes. Thus,
it will be able to move the radar away quickly for a distance
allowing the radar to survive, despite being hit by splinters
coming from the explosion of an anti-radiation missile. The
“drop” of the antenna should mean an immediate lowering
of the antenna by the force of gravity force. The antenna
should be located on a specially constructed mast and contain
subassemblies allowing for the absorbing of the energy of the
falling antenna strike (e.g. EPAR[13] technology, in which
after the clash of two objects the kinetic energy of the fast-
moving masses is absorbed by the mechanical rotary energy
accumulator). The EPAR technology is based on transforming
the kinetic energy of linear motion into kinetic energy of
angular motion). The collapsing of the stabilizing supports
can also be performed immediately and it should occur right
after the “drop” of the antenna. Automatic “throwing away”
of the cables and light pipes, which shall lead to the further
shortening of the radar folding time, will be possible if they
will all be located in one place as a multi-pipe “fast-junction”.
The starting and driving of the radar away must be performed
automatically. The vehicle should be equipped with electric
gear wheels, while the electric engine should be characterized
by high torque and started by an automatic electric signal.
Summing up, on the basis of the available technologies, it
is possible to shorten the time of the radar remaining on radar
picket even to less than 60 seconds (one minute): about 10s
of electromagnetic radiation, about 5s for radar folding, about
45s for a drive of more or less 60m (with the speed of about
5km/h, i.e. about 1.4m/s).
VI. IMMUNITY AGAINST ATTACK
The inside of the radar is sheathed by a soft thin metal sheet
(about 1.5-2 mm), under which a delicate but complex web of
wire-wrap conjunctions are located. Such fragile conjunctions,
as well as equally fragile other subassemblies need protection
– the inside of a radar is composed entirely of very breakable
elements. At present, even the immediate reaction of the radar
personnel to the detected anti-radiation missile will not protect
the radar against the consequences of an attack. Therefore, in
order to survive, the radar must be lightly armored.
The armor should not protect only some of the main
subassemblies, just like in the case of some radars now in
existence (e.g. NUR-21, NUR-22, Piranha 740 – Giraffe),
but it should also shield the fragile subassemblies of the
antenna (radiating elements and the lifting mechanism) and
the stabilizing supports.
The antenna should be protected without a break while
operating. The parameters of an armor plate able to protect
the mechanism against splinters of the AGM-88C HARM are
well known (6.35 mm). Apart from an armor plate, other
lighter materials can be used to protect a radar antenna (Kevlar,
composites with ceramic antiballistic layers, reactive armor,
armors of the Chobham type).
The armoring should be as lightweight as possible and
located at the rear side of the antenna, lifting and rotating
together with it while operating in combat. Having detected
an anti-radiation missile, the antenna must be automatically
turned with its armored side towards the nearing missile and
it must start to “drop”. In the moment of explosion splinters of
the missile exploding a few meters above the ground will hit
the armor, leaving the antenna protected, regardless of its type
(headlight antenna, phased array antenna or active antenna).
The best solution would be ultimately to hide the antenna
inside the armored vehicle and the antenna armor itself would
shield it from above.
VII. HEIGHT OF THE RAISED ANTENNA
The height of the raised radar antenna (e.g. 7m for NUR-26
or 12m for ESR 220 Thutlwa [14]) depends, among other
things, on the weight of the antenna set and its base (i.e.
location of the centre of gravity), the construction of the
antenna unfolding mechanism and the strength of stabilizing
supports. A large, armored and stable vehicle shall serve as the
best base for a radar with an antenna that could be raised very
high, since the substantial multiple point stabilization of the
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TABLE I
ANTI-RADIATION MISSILES – PARAMETERS (N.D.A. – NO DATA AVAILABLE).
Missile type Ch-15P Alarm Ch-32P Ch-31PD Ch-58USzE Armiger AGM-88 D Harm Block 6
[Ch-22MP] Ch-31PM Ch-58USzKE / AGM-88E AARGM
Country USSR Great USSR Russia Russia Germany USA
Britain
Years of 1988 1991 1995 [1975] 2002 / 2005 n.d.a. / 2007 2008 2003 / 2009
implementation
Flight speed [m/s] 1000 – 1100 320 1190 600 – 700 / 600 – 700 450 – 600 n.d.a. 680
max. 1700 max. 695 max. 1000 / max. 1170 max. 1166 max. 1020 max. 2040
Minimum range [km] 40 8 n.d.a. 15 / n.d.a. 10-12 n.d.a. n.d.a.
Minimum range 40 – 36 25 – 25 – 21 / – 26 – 16 – –
flight time [s] min. 23 min. 11 min. 15 / – min. 8
Maximum range 150 45 – 93 700 180 – 250 / n.d.a. 245 200 180 / 110
[km]
Maximum range 150 – 136 140 – 290 588 257 – 416 / – 544 – 408 – 264 / 161
flight time [s] min. 88 min. 64 min. 180 / – min. 210 min. 196 min. 88 / min. 53
Fig. 1. Threat avoidance design for of a mid-range radar.
vehicle along with the radar together with strong stabilizing
supports shall allow for operating in all kinds of terrain
conditions.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Conclusions concerning the construction of modern radars:
• both radars and the antennas themselves should be ar-
mored;
• in a modern battlefield, it is utterly necessary to shorten
the time of radar folding and its leaving of the radar
picket;
• the construction of a radar should allow for operating with
an antenna raised high (without the necessity of modify-
ing the terrain, i.e. without using the embankments)[15].
IX. REQUIREMENTS
In order to design the radar surveillance system of the 21st
century the next step that must be undertaken is a functional
linking of radars. The consoles that are produced at present
are able to control only some particular types of radars (e.g.
RAT-31DL). As a result, such a console shall ensure control
over just a fraction of the whole system, but it does not permit
the complex control over the whole radar surveillance system.
It has already been recognized as necessary to construct
universal radar control consoles (standardization), as well as
to design new radars, which would be universal within NATO
in the context of standardized control. The most important
requirements concerning a modern radar surveillance system
include the following: high survivability (due to armoring,
among others); detecting all types of air objects; supporting
the tactical and operational situation analysis with the aid of
“intelligent” software; full cooperation with other surveillance
and command systems; module construction; possibility of
controlling the radar from different levels (fully flexible oper-
ation).
The optimal use of the radar surveillance system should
be based on two control levels: tactical and operational.
Functional linking of the individual radars into one two-
level system will allow for gaining full control over all radar
operating parameters, which, in turn, would provide full use
of the system. The task of the tactical control level shall be the
providing of the correct functioning of the radar surveillance
system by the performance of many internal functions (e.g.
maintaining a continuous detection and identification process
and high survivability of the elements of the battle line).
In turn, the task of the operational control level should be
the controlling of the radar surveillance system by defining
the parameters of its radar surveillance zone and activating
individual elements of this zone, including the operation of
other air surveillance systems, so that the operation time of
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the actively radiating radars could be shortened. This would
lead to the limiting of the destruction of radars and facilitate
their maneuvering).
Such a solution would allow the radar surveillance system
to respond flexibly to the development of both the operational
and tactical situation (resulting from the actual state of the
Air Defense System functioning). Effective information flow
within the system, as a part of the controlling process, shall,
above others, allow for precise distribution of tasks to the
tactical and operational level, in so far as the functioning of
the radar surveillance system in the modern battlefield.
Achieving such capabilities shall also provide the possibility
of the dynamic shaping of the radar surveillance zone param-
eters
X. SUMMARY
Nowadays, the existing radar surveillance systems of the
Air Defense system have very little chance of surviving the
first phase of a military conflict, not to mention surviving its
whole duration, which was proved by the few recent ones.
Therefore, it is necessary to seek new solutions in this field,
which would be resistant to the destructive effects of modern
combat assets.
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